



Toshkent davlat sharqshunoslik universiteti

Sharqshunoslik. Востоковедение. Oriental Studies

SHARQSHUNOSLIK
ВОСТОКОВЕДЕНИЕ
ORIENTAL STUDIES

Jurnal websayti:

<https://orientalstudies.uz/index.php/os>QOZOG'ISTON VA XITOIY XALQ RESPUBLIKASI MUNOSABATLARIDA
ENERGIYA XAVFSIZLIGINING ROLI*Gungor Shahin**Dotsent,**Ismoil Po'lat**Ph.D. Mustaqil tadqiqotchi**Turkiya Milliy Mudofaa Universiteti**Otaturk strategik tadqiqotlar instituti*

MAQOLA HAQIDA

Kalit so'zlar: Energiya
xavfsizligi, energetika
diplomatiyasi, Qozog'iston, Xitoy.

Annotatsiya: Ushbu tadqiqot Xitoyning "Bir makon bir yo'l" tashabbusi kontekstida bozordagi ustun mavqeini va ishlab chiqarish imkoniyatlarini saqlab qolgan holda xomashyodan to'siqsiz foydalanishni ta'minlash uchun energiya diplomatiyasini amalga oshirishini o'rganadi. Energiya xavfsizligi Xitoyning global ta'sirini saqlab qolishning eng muhim omillaridan biriga aylanib bormoqda va Qozog'istonning energiya resurslari va strategik joylashuvi katta e'tiborni tortmoqda. Maqolada Xitoyning energiya xavfsizligi strategiyalari, xususan, Qozog'iston bilan aloqalari kontekstida logistika, milliy xavfsizlik, geosiyosat, jismoniy xavfsizlik, bozorlar va barqarorlik nuqtai nazaridan tahlil qilinadi. Gipotezada energiya xavfsizligini nafaqat iqtisodiy va madaniy aloqalar, balki siyosiy va harbiy hamkorlik orqali ham ta'minlash kerakligi ta'kidlangan. Tadqiqotda xitoylik olim Von Tintin va Richard Weitz tomonidan taklif etilgan uchta model Xitoyning energiya xavfsizligini ta'minlash strategiyasi, bu modellardan Qozog'iston misolida ko'rib chiqiladi. Sifatli tadqiqot usullari va adabiyotlarni ko'rib chiqishdan foydalangan holda, ushbu tahlil 1991 yildan 2021 yilgacha bo'lgan voqealarni qamrab oladi.

THE ROLE OF ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN - PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA RELATIONS*Güngör Şahin**Associate Professor, Turkish National Defence University,**Atatürk Strategic Studies and Graduate Institute*

ORCID: 0000-0001-6296-8568

Ismail Polat

Ph. D. Independent Researcher

ORCID: 0000-0002-6303-0085

ORCID: 0000-0002-6303-0085 **ABOUT ARTICLE**

Key words: Energy Security, Energy Diplomacy, Kazakhstan, China..

Abstract: This study examines China's implementation of energy diplomacy to ensure smooth access to raw materials while maintaining its market dominance and production capacity within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Energy security emerges as a critical factor for maintaining China's global influence, with Kazakhstan's energy resources and strategic location drawing significant Chinese attention. The paper analyzes China's energy security strategies, particularly in the context of its relations with Kazakhstan, from logistical, national security, geopolitical, physical security, market, and sustainability perspectives. The hypothesis posits that energy security must be supported not only through economic and cultural relations but also through political and military engagements. The study explores three models proposed by Chinese scholar Fon Tintin and references Richard Weitz's strategies for China's energy security, applying these models to the Kazakhstan case study. Utilizing qualitative research methods and a literature review, this analysis covers developments from 1991 to 2021.

**РОЛЬ ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ МЕЖДУ
КАЗАХСТАНОМ И КИТАЙСКОЙ НАРОДНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ**

Гюнгор Шахин

Доцент,

Исмаил Полат

PhD, независимый исследователь

Турецкий национальный университет обороны,

Институт стратегических исследований и аспирантуры имени Ататюрка

О СТАТЬЕ

Ключевые слова: Энергетическая безопасность, энергетическая дипломатия, Казахстан, Китай.

Аннотация: В данном исследовании рассматривается реализация Китаем энергетической дипломатии для обеспечения беспрепятственного доступа к сырью при сохранении своего доминирующего положения на рынке и производственного потенциала в контексте инициативы «Пояс и Путь». Энергетическая безопасность становится одним из важнейших факторов сохранения глобального влияния Китая, а энергетические ресурсы и стратегическое расположение Казахстана привлекают значительное внимание к себе. В статье анализируются стратегии энергетической безопасности Китая, особенно в контексте его отношений с Казахстаном, с точки

зрения логистики, национальной безопасности, геополитики, физической безопасности, рынка и устойчивости. В гипотезе утверждается, что энергетическая безопасность должна поддерживаться не только через экономические и культурные отношения, но и через политические и военные взаимодействия. В исследовании рассматриваются три модели, предложенные китайским ученым Фон Тинтином, и стратегии Ричарда Вайца по обеспечению энергетической безопасности Китая, с применением этих моделей на примере Казахстана. Используя методы качественного исследования и обзор литературы, данный анализ охватывает события с 1991 по 2021 год.

INTRODUCTION

Since its economic reforms in 1978, China has opened up to the international arena, gradually asserting its influence through its production power. By 2013, with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, China began to engage in partnerships with other international actors across political, military, economic, and cultural spheres on a global scale. To realize this ambitious project, China requires a seamless access to raw materials, ensuring the sustainability of its market presence and production capacity. This necessity has driven China to pursue 'energy diplomacy' on the international stage. In this context, Kazakhstan, with its abundant energy resources and strategic location, has emerged as a focal point of Chinese interest. Thus, the aim of this study is to examine China-Kazakhstan relations within the framework of energy diplomacy.

The study of energy security, defined as ensuring the availability of resources in the desired quantity, at the right time, in the right place, and at an affordable cost, has seen increasing prominence within the field of international relations. As access to and the utilization of energy have become central factors driving recent debates, threats, and conflicts, states have increasingly shifted their foreign policy focus toward energy security. Moreover, new concepts such as "energy diplomacy" have emerged in the academic literature. Among the states most closely associated with energy security is China, where rapid economic growth has led to a substantial increase in energy demand, prompting distinct foreign policy responses. This study focuses on China's approaches, implementation models, and strategies related to energy security. These approaches will be examined through various lenses, including logistics, national security, geopolitics, physical security, market dynamics, and sustainability, with a particular focus on China-Kazakhstan relations. The analysis will consider the three models developed by Chinese scholar Feng TinTin and reference the strategies proposed by Richard Weitz concerning China's

energy security, specifically applying these frameworks to the Kazakhstan case. By investigating China's energy security strategies and behaviors, this study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how major powers adjust their foreign policies in response to the growing significance of energy security in the global arena.

Based on the information provided, the hypothesis of this study is formulated as follows: China must resolve issues through diplomatic channels and deepen relations through military agreements to ensure energy security. The significance of this study lies in demonstrating that energy security between two states can be achieved not only through economic and cultural relations but also through political and military cooperation. In this context, the study posits that energy security cannot be successfully achieved without support from the political and military sectors. The study's scope is confined to the analysis of political and military relations between 1991 and 2021, adhering strictly to the defined parameters. A qualitative research methodology is employed, with literature review and content analysis serving as the primary data collection techniques. Throughout this process, the study will reference agreements, reports, declarations, activity reports from ministries and international organizations, books, and online sources.

1. Energy Security and Implementation Models

Energy security is fundamentally defined as the ability to ensure that the desired quantity of resources is available at the right time, in the right place, and at an affordable cost. In the context of energy security, the literature identifies six distinct approaches: logistics, national security, geopolitics, physical security, market dynamics, and sustainability.¹ The logistics approach focuses on ensuring that the desired quantity of resources is available at the right time, in the right place, and at an affordable cost. The national security approach emphasizes securing the supply of energy by diversifying sources and ensuring cost-effective procurement. The geopolitical approach highlights the importance of controlling or having influence over critical geographic areas that facilitate the transfer of energy resources to desired locations. The physical security approach involves protecting the necessary infrastructure and transportation channels from environmental threats, accidents, sabotage, and piracy to ensure the safe and cost-effective delivery of energy. The market approach focuses on aligning energy supply and demand optimally, with an emphasis on price stability. Lastly, the sustainability approach underscores the importance of developing, producing, transporting, and consuming energy resources in a manner that does not degrade the conditions necessary for their continued availability.

¹ Mert Bilgin, "Enerji", Şaban Kardaş ve Ali Balcı, Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, ss. 605-606.

Following the energy crisis of the mid-1970s, several countries developed external energy policies and energy diplomacy, which are functional aspects of foreign policy and diplomacy aimed at ensuring national energy security. In today's global context, Chinese scholar Fan Tintin characterizes contemporary energy policy models through three primary frameworks.² The first model, predominant in the United States, Japan, and some other countries, involves state regulation combined with a competitive market approach. In this model, the leading role is assigned to private companies, with limited state ownership and minimal direct public administration. The second model is built on the integration of a competitive joint energy market and the development of a unified public policy across a group of countries. This model is most clearly represented in the energy policies of the European Union and Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) and essentially signifies a reduction in the role of nation-states. China's energy policy, as described by Tintin, aligns with the third model, which is characterized by a national monopoly. This model is marked by the state's desire for a directive approach to energy management, aiming for control over essential resources (indicated by a high proportion of state ownership in energy industries). Additionally, energy policy within this model is primarily viewed as a tool for the broader development of the national economy.

2. China's Strategies in the Framework of Energy Security


China has achieved rapid economic growth and emerged as a key player in the global market. However, concerns have arisen due to the imbalance between energy production and consumption, prompting the implementation of specific foreign policy measures. The energy strategy published on the State Council's website underscores that securing energy resources and ensuring energy security are directly linked to the country's modernization process.³ Given factors such as inadequate energy resources, the imbalance between energy supply and consumption, low energy efficiency, and environmental crises, China is developing strategies to address or minimize threats to energy access.

Before discussing China's strategies for energy security, it is helpful to examine three graphs related to China's energy needs for a clearer understanding of the issue. Due to the extensive authority of the Chinese government in formulating and implementing state policies, significant economic reforms were enacted in 1978, which increased China's influence on the

² Igor Tomberg, "21. Yüzyılda ÇHC Enerji Politikasının Oluşması: İç Kaynaklar ve Ekonomik Perspektifler" ('Formirovaniye Energetičeskoj Politiki KNR v Naçale XXI Veka: Vnutrenniye Resursı i Mirohozaystvenniye Perspektivı'), Ekonomi Bilim Dalı Doktora Tezi, Rus Bilim Akademisi Doğu Bilimler Enstitüsü, Moskova 2017, ss 43-46.

³ Energy strategy plan (2014-2020). Website of the Central government of the People's Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/19/content_9222.htm (Access: 22 August 2024).

international stage and established it as a global production hub.⁴ In 1978, China's annual GDP was \$149.541 billion, which rose to \$18.100 trillion by 2022.⁵ As a natural consequence of this growth in production and the economy, China's need for energy has increased annually, as shown in Graph 1, leading China to pursue various strategies for energy access. Additionally, according to 2022 data, China was the largest energy consumer globally in 2021. Graph 3 illustrates the commodity breakdown: 55% coal, 19% oil, 9% natural gas, and 17% other sources. The four graphs mentioned include: the first graph showing the energy sources used by China in 2021 to clarify its energy needs; the second graph illustrating the imbalance between production and consumption using oil and liquid resources as examples; and the third graph assessing energy needs internationally on a country-by-country basis.⁶




Chaph 1: Types of raw materials from which China obtains energy


⁴ — Communist Party, Government and Army I have a say in the country's governance

⁵ 'China GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2023', CountryEconomy, 2023, <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/china?year=2023> (Access: 22 August 2024).

⁶ 'Primary Energy Consumption by Country 2023', Statista, 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263455/primary-energy-consumption-of-selected-countries/> (Access: 22 August 2024).



Chaph 2: China's production and consumption of oil and other liquids between 2000 and 2021



Chaph 3: Top five countries in energy consumption in 2021

In light of the above data, China pursues three interconnected strategies in the context of energy security. First, it aims to maximize production and attract foreign direct investment by revitalizing the domestic energy sector. Second, it seeks to diversify its energy resources to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and control pollution. Third, it focuses on diversifying foreign

energy sources to limit dependence on any single country or region. To support these strategies, China deploys its diplomats globally under the framework of "energy diplomacy."⁷

In this context, the first strategy involves China dominating the global market economically by increasing production activities to ensure sustainability, attracting foreign investors, and controlling international actors within its own sphere, while also aiming to provide employment opportunities. The second strategy addresses the imbalance resulting from China's rapid economic development and growing energy needs by increasing the diversity of energy sources to minimize potential shortages and threats. The third strategy focuses on implementing an "energy diplomacy" that encompasses various economic, military, and political activities to ensure that China does not remain dependent on any single country or region.

3. China-Kazakhstan Relations

Relations between Kazakhstan and China began in 1992, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan's attainment of independence. In the early years of Kazakhstan's independence, the relationship between the two countries remained relatively stable. However, the relationship gained momentum with the rise of Xi Jinping and the emphasis placed on Central Asia within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. This study will examine the period from the inception of relations in 1991 to 2021. The analysis will be divided into two sections: political relations and military relations.

3.1. Political Relations

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China recognized Kazakhstan, which declared its independence on December 16, 1991, on December 27, 1991.⁸ The official beginning of Kazakhstan-China relations is marked by January 3, 1992. During this initial contact, issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs were addressed.⁹ Moreover, in this first contact, Kazakhstan declared that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory, while China emphasized its support for Kazakhstan's efforts to maintain national independence and strengthen its economy.¹⁰

After mutual recognition, priority issues between the two countries were addressed, including agreements from the Soviet era and border issues. Kazakhstan and China share a

⁷ Richard Weitz, 'China's Energy Security Strategy', World Politics Review (blog), 2010, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/chinas-energy-security-strategy/> (21 August 2024).

⁸ Справка: "Важные события в истории отношений между Китаем и Казахстаном", Посольство Китайской Народной Республики в Республике Казахстан, Access 20 August 2024, http://kz.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/zhgx/201106/t20110623_1045183.htm.

⁹ "Справка: Важные события в истории отношений между Китаем и Казахстаном".

¹⁰ "Совместное коммюнике об установлении дипломатических отношений между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой", içinde Информационная система ПАРАГРАФ (Алма-Ата, 1992), https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1028951.

border of 1,783 kilometers and more than 20 transboundary rivers.¹¹ Therefore, border issues were among the primary concerns. Since 1992, negotiations were conducted with initiatives from both sides, leading to the signing of the *"Agreement on the State Border between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* on April 26, 1994.¹² Despite some remaining issues, the decision was made to establish a "Joint Border Commission." This was followed by additional agreements in 1996¹³ and 1998,¹⁴ culminating in the "Joint Notification" of 1999.¹⁵ By 2002, border issues were resolved.¹⁶

Regarding transboundary rivers, the Ili and Irtysh rivers are significant. The Ili River has a total length of 1,439 kilometers and a drainage area of 140,000 square kilometers. It is the main water source for Almaty in southeastern Kazakhstan and feeds 80% of Lake Balkhash. According to the agreement, 815 kilometers of the Ili River's course remains within Kazakhstan. The Irtysh River, with a total length of 4,280 kilometers and a drainage area of 1,643,000 square kilometers, serves as the primary water source for the people in northern Kazakhstan. Of the Irtysh River's length, 618 kilometers is in China, and 1,698 kilometers is in Kazakhstan.¹⁷

The first official document between Kazakhstan and China was signed during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's inaugural official visit to Beijing from October 18-21, 1993. The *"Joint Statement on the Foundations of Friendly Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* signed on October 18, 1993, established initial guidelines for political and economic cooperation. It highlighted the commitment to peaceful resolutions of disputes, mutual respect, non-interference in domestic affairs, and avoidance of actions that could jeopardize the security of the other party. In this agreement, Kazakhstan acknowledged Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, while China expressed its support for

¹¹ I. S. Zonn vd., "Transboundary Rivers of Kazakhstan and China", Bulletin of the Moscow University named S U Vitte Series 1 Economics and management, 2018, 83-85, <https://doi.org/10.21777/2587-554X-2018-4-82-90>.

¹² "О подписании Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о режиме казахстанско-китайской государственной границы", 2006, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P060001209_.

¹³ "О дальнейшем продолжении переговоров с Китайской Народной Республикой по пограничным вопросам и о составе делегации Республики Казахстан на этих переговорах - ИПС 'Әділет'", Access 19 January 2023, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P960000378_.

¹⁴ "О проекте Закона Республики Казахстан "О ратификации Дополнительного Соглашения между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой о казахстанско-китайской государственной границе", 1998, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P980001365_/info.

¹⁵ "О ратификации Дополнительного Соглашения между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой о казахстанско-китайской государственной границе - ИПС 'Әділет'", 1999, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z990000351_/info.

¹⁶ "Протокол между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о демаркации линии казахстанско-китайской государственной границы", Информационная система ПАРАГРАФ, 2002, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=36400258.

¹⁷ Zonn vd., "Transboundary Rivers of Kazakhstan and China", 83-85.

Kazakhstan's efforts to establish the *Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia* (CICA).¹⁸

During Kazakh President Nazarbayev's official visit to Beijing from September 11-13, 1995, the *"Joint Statement on Further Development and Deepening of Friendly Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed. This agreement established five principles for peaceful coexistence in political relations and emphasized opposition to hegemony and power politics within the framework of sovereign equality in international relations. Following this, China underscored the importance of preserving Kazakhstan's internal stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while Kazakhstan reiterated that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. That same year, China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear club member, provided security guarantees to Kazakhstan.¹⁹

From July 4-6, 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made his first official visit to Kazakhstan. During this visit, the *"Joint Statement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed on July 5, 1996, in Almaty. This marked the first time a Chinese President officially visited independent Kazakhstan and signed a joint statement, significantly enhancing mutual trust and developing relations between the two sovereign states.²⁰

On November 23-27, 1999, during President Nazarbayev's official visit to Beijing, the *"Joint Statement on Strengthening Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China in the 21st Century"* was signed. This statement outlined mutual agreement on measures to counter separatism, religious extremism, terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and other unlawful activities.²¹

From July 27-30, 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made an official visit to Almaty, where discussions were held on responding to regional and global developments in the new century.²² Subsequently, from December 22-25, 2002, President Nazarbayev visited Beijing, and on December 23, 2002, the *"Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation*

¹⁸ "Совместная Декларация об основах дружественных взаимоотношений между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой", Информационная система ПАРАГРАФ, 2013, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1025860.

¹⁹ "Хроника деятельности Первого Президента Республики Казахстан - Елбасы", ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ САЙТ ПЕРВОГО ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН — ЕЛБАСЫ НУРСУЛТАНА НАЗАРБАЕВА, 1994, <https://chronicle.elbasy.kz/ru/1994/?sdc>.

²⁰ "Справка: Важные события в истории отношений между Китаем и Казахстаном".

²¹ "Совместная Декларация между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой о дальнейшем укреплении всестороннего сотрудничества в двадцать первом веке (г. Пекин, 23 ноября 1999 г.)", Информационная система ПАРАГРАФ, 1999, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1028916.

²² Шаймергенов, Казахстан-Китай: три десятилетия добрососедского и взаимовыгодного сотрудничества, 73.

between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China" was signed. This treaty finalized the border arrangements between the two states, emphasizing that the Kazakhstan-China border should become a boundary of trust, peace, security, and prosperity.²³

From June 2-4, 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a state visit to Astana, where the *"Joint Statement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed in Astana. In the same year, the establishment of the Consulate General of Kazakhstan in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China was decided.²⁴ On July 3-4, 2005, during President Hu Jintao's official visit to Astana, an agreement was reached on July 4, 2005, to *"Establish and develop a strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and China"*. This agreement emphasized the promotion of cooperation in areas such as common security, political stability, and economic collaboration, and highlighted the importance of strengthening friendship between the peoples of the two countries.²⁵

Between December 19 and 23, 2006, during President Nazarbayev's official visit to Beijing, the *"Cooperation Strategy between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China in the 21st Century"* was signed in Beijing on December 20, 2006. The agreement emphasized the continuation of high-level political dialogue between the parties and highlighted the necessity of concrete steps to address current issues in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation.²⁶ On August 18, 2007, during the official visit of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China to Astana, the *"Joint Statement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed.²⁷ Subsequently, on June 12-14, 2011, during President Hu Jintao's official visit to Kazakhstan, the *"Joint Statement on the Development of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed. This agreement outlined continued contact on regional and global issues, as well as cooperation to encourage comprehensive exchanges among governments, legislative bodies, political parties, public organizations, businesses, and financial institutions.²⁸

²³ "Справка: Важные события в истории отношений между Китаем и Казахстаном".

²⁴ "Совместная Декларация Республики Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республики", Access 18 January 2023, http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/jbwzlm/zegx/sbgx/200306/t20030605_3153554.htm.

²⁵ "Совместная декларация Китая и Казахстана об установлении и развитии стратегического партнерства", 2005, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/gb/200507/t20050704_858105.html.

²⁶ Шаймергенов, Казахстан-Китай: три десятилетия добрососедского и взаимовыгодного сотрудничества. "Ху Цзиньтао прибыл в Казахстан с государственным визитом и для участия в саммите ШОС", Министерство Иностранных Дел Китайской Народной Республики, 2011, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zl/ce_ceml_chn/hzxcxjlt/201106/t20110613_878190.html.

²⁷ "Совместное коммюнике Китайской Народной Республики и Республики Казахстан (полный текст)", 2007, http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/jbwzlm/sgxw/200708/t20070818_3153095.htm.

²⁸ "Ху Цзиньтао прибыл в Казахстан с государственным визитом и для участия в саммите ШОС".

On September 6-8, 2013, during President Xi Jinping's official visit to Astana, the *"Joint Statement on Further Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed. Additionally, on September 7, 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the initiative to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt. In his speech in Astana in 2013, Xi Jinping also announced the Maritime Silk Road strategy, highlighting China's geopolitical interest in Kazakhstan.²⁹ This speech had a significant impact on the Kazakh side, prompting immediate preparations at Kazakh ports for the Belt and Road Initiative.³⁰

Another factor influencing political relations between Kazakhstan and China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Founded with the purpose of enhancing peace, security, and stability in the region, the SCO has facilitated significant steps in resolving border disputes, addressing ethnic issues, and combating terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drug problems.³¹ The SCO has played a crucial role in addressing threats to regional stability posed by terrorism, separatism, and extremist groups.³² In this context, there is a close link between the SCO and defense diplomacy. Within the SCO framework, both states are committed to combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Security is a key component of their bilateral relations. For instance, China is aware of the shared heritage between Uyghurs and Kazakhs in East Turkistan and maintains close relations with Kazakhstan to prevent any potential support for East Turkistan from Astana.³³

Another political issue is the perceived Chinese threat or Sinophobia in Kazakhstan. The continuous leasing of Kazakh land by Chinese nationals and the ongoing migration of Chinese people into Kazakhstan have provoked reactions from Kazakh intellectuals. Kazakhstan, despite being one of the largest countries in the world by area, has a relatively small population compared to its vast landmass. Conversely, China, as the most populous country, struggles with space constraints. Consequently, Kazakh intellectuals approach China with caution.³⁴

Nevertheless, it is important to note that while the issues of East Turkistan and Sinophobia are prevalent among the Kazakh populace, the Kazakh government continues to strive to strengthen its relations with China within a realpolitik framework. Bilateral relations, which

²⁹ Andrew Chatzky ve James McBride, "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative", Council on Foreign Relations, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

³⁰ Fırat Purtaş ve Ömer Faruk Kocatepe, "Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında Bölgesel İşbirliği", içinde 30. Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetleri: Bölgesel Politika, ed. Fırat Yıldız (Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi, 2021), 15-34.

³¹ Aydın Aydın, "Orta Asya'daki Güvenlik Sorunlarının Çözümünde Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün Etkinliği", Turkish Studies 11, sy 1 (2016): 149-57.

³² Aydın, 158-59.

³³ Ekrem ve Çolpan Yıldız, "Türk Cumhuriyetleri-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri", 90-91.

³⁴ Ekrem ve Çolpan Yıldız, "Türk Cumhuriyetleri-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri".

began at the level of strategic partnership in 2005, expanded and deepened over time, reaching a comprehensive strategic partnership in June 2011. In August 2015, a joint statement was signed to advance to a new stage of comprehensive strategic partnership, and in September 2019, the relationship transitioned to an everlasting and comprehensive strategic partnership. During President Tokayev's official visit to Beijing from September 10-13, 2019, the *"Agreement on Developing a Comprehensive and Everlasting Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* was signed.³⁵ During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, mutual aid and support were provided, and in 2021, participation in international conferences was ensured.³⁶

3.2. Military Relations

Kazakhstan, leveraging its geopolitical position, has been diligently managing its military relations while simultaneously enhancing its political and economic ties with other nations. In this context, Kazakhstan has engaged in multiple agreements with China under bilateral frameworks as well as within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These agreements encompass military equipment and technical assistance, defense collaborations, intelligence and information sharing, joint exercises, military consulting, training, meetings, seminars, and visits, reflecting a robust application of defense diplomacy. The initial step towards fostering friendly relations between Kazakhstan and China was taken with Resolution No. 607 on July 17, 1992, aimed at reducing armed forces along their shared border as per Cold War-era agreements. Subsequently, the scope of this agreement was expanded, with concrete measures taken on April 26, 1996, April 24, 1997, November 23, 2002, and June 21, 2004, significantly advancing mutual friendship and trust.³⁷

Under the *"Joint Statement on the Foundations of Friendly Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* signed on October 18, 1993, both sides agreed to establish contact between military units to enhance mutual trust and cooperation in the military domain. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that neither party would join any military alliances directed against the other.³⁸

³⁵ “Президент Касым-Жомарт Токаев провел встречу с Председателем КНР Си Цзиньпином — Официальный сайт Президента Республики Казахстан”.

³⁶ “Китай и Казахстан опубликовали Совместное заявление по случаю 30-летия установления дипотношений между двумя странами_Russian.news.cn”, Access 19 January 2023, <https://russian.news.cn/20220915/1db83039a8e1474abf90359c6500112e/c.html>.

³⁷ “О переговорах с Китайской Народной Республикой по взаимному сокращению вооруженных сил и укреплению доверия в военной области в районе казахско-китайской границы и о переговорах по пограничным вопросам - ИПС ‘Әділет’”, 1992, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P920000607_/info.

³⁸ “Совместная Декларация об основах дружественных взаимоотношений между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой”.

On February 24, 1997, the *"Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement"* between Kazakhstan and China was ratified. This agreement outlines economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the armed forces and defense industry organizations of both countries. Areas of cooperation include military equipment for land, naval, and air forces, joint research and development, exchange of military equipment specialists, and the repair and modernization of special equipment and components.³⁹

On April 21, 2000, Decision No. N-620 confirmed China's provision of a grant of 3,000,000 Chinese Yuan to the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan.⁴⁰ Furthermore, on June 17, 2002, an agreement between the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Public Security of China was established to maintain border stability and strengthen mutual trust and good neighborliness, with a focus on mutual information exchange.⁴¹ On August 8, 2002, Decision No. 885 led to the signing of an agreement between the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Defense of China on border cooperation, committing both parties to information exchange to maintain order in border regions.⁴²

During President Nazarbayev's visit to Beijing from December 22-25, 2002, the *"Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China"* signed on December 23, 2002, established agreements on mutual assistance in military training and education to strengthen friendly ties between defense departments and military institutions.⁴³ The parties also agreed to a joint stance against terrorism, extremism, and separatism in accordance with the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism dated June 15, 2001.⁴⁴

In addition to bilateral military/security relations, Kazakhstan and China participate jointly in various organizations. For example, the first phase of anti-terrorism exercises among SCO member states was conducted under the name "Interaction 2003," involving China, Russia,

³⁹ "Об утверждении Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о военно-техническом сотрудничестве", 1997, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P970000258_/info.

⁴⁰ "О подписании Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о предоставлении безвозмездной помощи Правительством Китайской Народной Республики Вооруженным Силам Республики Казахстан на сумму 3 000 000 китайских юаней", 2000, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P000000620_/info.

⁴¹ "О подписании Соглашения между Комитетом национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан и Министерством обороны Китайской Народной Республики о пограничном сотрудничестве", 2002, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P020000885_/info.

⁴² "О подписании Соглашения между Комитетом национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан и Министерством обороны Китайской Народной Республики о пограничном сотрудничестве".

⁴³ "Назарбаев, Нурсултан. Эксклюзивное интервью Президента Казахстана Н. А. Назарбаева газете "Жэньминь жибао", 2004, http://kz.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/zhgx/200409/t20040928_1044320.htm.

⁴⁴ А. В. Змеевский, "Шанхайская конвенция о борьбе с терроризмом, сепаратизмом и экстремизмом", *Moscow Journal of International Law*, sy 4 (2001): 3-10.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.⁴⁵ In 2004, Kazakhstan participated as an observer in the "Iron Fist-2004" exercise held in China.⁴⁶ In March 2006, the "East-Terror Combat 2006" exercise, involving China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, was held in Uzbekistan.⁴⁷ Later in August 2006, the "Tien-Shan-1" exercise took place in Kazakhstan,⁴⁸ conducted jointly by Kazakhstan and China. The "Peace Mission 2007" exercise, held in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in August 2007, saw active participation from both China and Kazakhstan.⁴⁹ In September 2010, the "Peace Mission 2010" exercise took place in Kazakhstan with active participation from both countries. In May 2011, the "Tien Shan-2-2011" anti-terrorism exercise was conducted in Kashgar, China, with participation from special services and law enforcement agencies of SCO member states. From 2012 to 2021, China and Kazakhstan continued to engage in regular joint exercises.⁵⁰

In addition to military relations within the SCO framework, bilateral relations have deepened over time. On February 4, 2015, Decision No. 29 established an "*Agreement on technical assistance as a form of gratuitous aid to the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan*" further developing military cooperation.⁵¹ On August 28, 2015, Decision No. 673 outlined the provision of 30 million Chinese Yuan in "*Technical assistance to equip the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan*".⁵²

On November 22, 2018, Decision No. 783 formalized the "*Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation*," which was approved by Decision No. 285 on May 15, 2019. This agreement encompasses joint ventures for the development, production, repair, modernization, and disposal of military products, as well as joint research and development, standardization of

⁴⁵ "Университет Шанхайской организации сотрудничества", Access 17 January 2023, <https://uni-sco.ru/>.

⁴⁶ "Китай: Представители 16 стран следили за военными учениями Железный кулак-2004", ЦентрАзия, 25 September 2004, <https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1096114320>.

⁴⁷ Антон Лымарь, "Совместные антитеррористические учения в рамках ШОС пройдут в августе в Китае", 24.kg, 2006, <https://24.kg/archive/ru/politic/243-2006/03/29/299.html/>.

⁴⁸ "Антитеррористические учения 'Тянь-Шань-1' (2006) начались в Казахстане", Все о Китае из первых рук, 25 August 2006, <http://russian.china.org.cn/russian/256113.htm>.

⁴⁹ "Военные учения «Мирная миссия – 2007» в дневниках корреспондентов", Китайский информационный Интернет-центр, 27 July 2007, http://russian.china.org.cn/exclusive/txt/2007-07/27/content_8589957.htm.

⁵⁰ "В Пекине состоялась седьмая встреча Секретарей Советов безопасности государств-членов ШОС", Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, 12 April 2012, <http://rus.sectsco.org/news/20120412/2123.html>.

⁵¹ "Об утверждении Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики об оказании технического содействия в качестве безвозмездной помощи Вооруженным Силам Республики Казахстан", 2015, <https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1500000029/info>.

⁵² "О подписании Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики об оказании на безвозмездной основе технической помощи (содействия) Вооруженным Силам Республики Казахстан", 2015, <https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1500000029>.

military equipment, training and education of military-technical personnel, and joint tests of weapons and military equipment.⁵³

Furthermore, the parties outlined cooperation in areas such as mutual visits of official delegations, working meetings of experts, development of military-technical programs, formation of agreements (contracts), presentations of weapon and military equipment samples, participation in arms and military equipment exhibitions, and attendance at theoretical and practical courses, seminars, conferences, and meetings on areas of mutual interest.⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

China is advancing its energy security through bilateral and multilateral relationships with international actors, guided by three primary strategies. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is particularly significant in addressing both economic and energy needs. This initiative aims to reduce China's reliance on oil and LNG imports from the Gulf countries and Africa by expanding cooperation with Central Asian suppliers. Furthermore, as the BRI covers regions from which China sourced 62% of its energy in 2019, including the Middle East and Africa, it underscores the close link between China's economic and energy interests. Another crucial aspect of China's strategy is ensuring the security of key strategic points such as the Hormuz and Malacca Straits, which are vital for energy access. Despite China's efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral engagements with Russia and Central Asia, it continues to employ energy diplomacy, involving military investments, aid, and strategies to increase dependency of target countries, to minimize threats along trade routes and secure energy access.

China's external policy behavior is centered on ensuring cost-effective energy transfer, timely and reliable delivery, diversification of resources for national security, influence over geopolitically significant locations, and maintaining physical security, market stability, and sustainability. As mentioned in the text, China's energy diplomacy is shaped by the state's dominance over energy policies. For instance, in the case of Kazakhstan, China has successfully ensured energy security through effective cost management and timely transfer. This success can be attributed to minimizing political issues between the two states, diversifying diplomatic engagement, and deepening military agreements. Although China's economic influence in the international market is substantial, its dependence on energy, as indicated by the data, is evident. Despite its high-level efforts to coordinate energy diplomacy, China's external policy may

⁵³ “О подписании Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о военно-техническом сотрудничестве”, 2018, <https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1800000783/info>.

⁵⁴ “Об утверждении Соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о военно-техническом сотрудничестве”.

sometimes conflict with the interests of other states. In bilateral relations, especially with Turkic Republics, it would be more prudent for states to adopt policies regarding energy resources that do not compromise their sovereignty.

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